Based on the well-known fact that social networks can provide effective mechanisms that help to increase the trust level between two trade partners, we apply a simple game-theoretical framework to derive transaction costs as a high risk of opportunistic behavior in a repeated trade relation determined by the density and size of trading networks. In the empirical part of the paper we apply a two stage procedure to estimate the impact of social network structures on farm's transaction costs observed for different input and output markets. At a first stage we estimate a multiple input-multiple output stochastic Ray production function to generate relative shadow prices of three inputs and two outputs traded by farms. At a second stage a structural equation system is derived from the first order conditions of farm's profit maximization to estimate simultaneously the parameters of commodity specific transaction cost functions for all traded farm inputs and outputs. Estimation results based on a sample of 315 Polish farms imply a significant influence of social network structures on farm's transaction costs. Moreover, estimated transaction costs correspond to a reasonable amount of farm specific shadow prices.
Introduction
In general, one can distinguish two different pathways for how social networks influence individual behavior and social outcomes: the impact of networks on cooperation and the impact of networks on beliefs (Jackson, 2008) . Regarding the first, economic and social exchange is often plagued by opportunistic behavior. Ensuring honest compliance with an explicit or implicit contract requires institutions to detect and punish cheating. In modern and developed economies, a well-functioning state legal system performs these functions. However, even within a well-functioning legal system, opportunistic behavior generally still occurs. Thus, self-governance has been studied as a form of governance, which complements rule-based systems (Dixit, 2003) . Self-governance corresponds to relation-based governance, i.e. the fact that cooperation is sustained via specific structures of interactions among actors.
Self-governance among a group of actors with repeated exchange among different partners can work if communication within the group permits a collective memory of cheating and group members punish cheaters by refusing to trade with them. Kandori (1992) developed a pioneering theoretical approach, which was elaborated on by Greif (1994) and more recently by Dixit (2003) . Moreover, in sociology, a well-established literature on social exchange and networks exists (Cook and Emerson, 1978; Raub and Weesie, 1990; Buskens, 2003) . However, despite these seminal contributions, it is fair to conclude that research on networks and cooperation is still in its infancy. In particular, existing economic studies focus on rather abstract models of relation-based self-governance. These models do not permit derivation of explicit hypotheses regarding how specific network structures impact cooperation (Dixit, 2003; Greif, 1994) . Moreover, existing studies mostly analyze the impact of network structure on cooperation or defection as a binary variable, while the degree of cooperation, or the costs of achieving cooperation, have hardly been studied as yet.
In this context, this article sets out (1) to develop a simple game-theoretical model in which transaction costs are derived from the risk of opportunistic behavior in repeated multilateral trade relations, (2) to demonstrate that individual transaction costs are determined by the structure of an agent's ego-centric (personal) business networks, and (3) to estimate empirically the impact of business network structures on farms' transaction costs observed for different input and output markets. Estimation results based on a sample of Polish farms imply a significant influence of social network structures on farms' transaction costs.
Theory

A simple trading world
Consider a simple trading world comprising two buyers and three sellers located in two regions. Let b = 1, 2 denote the buyers, while s = 3, 4, 5 denote the sellers.
Sellers and buyers are matched and can exchange two commodities, A and B. For a given exchange rate v, sellers are willing to exchange a specific quantity t of commodity A in return for a quantity v · t of commodity B. Sellers are defined as the agents who move first, while buyers, by definition, always respond. Thus, exchange is considered as a one-sided prisoner's dilemma game (OSPD), where only buyers can display opportunistic behavior. Let Π s (t, v) = v · t − C(t) and
denote the payoff functions of sellers and buyers, respectively. C(.) is a convex function, which reflects increasing marginal costs of production for commodity A. Quantityt b is understood as buyer b's maximum trading capacity.
Matches
The game is played in two periods. In the first period, buyers can decide whether they want to behave honestly or cheat. The appropriate reward or punishment for their behavior occurs in the second period, which is, as usual, interpreted as the reduced form of a longer future (Dixit, 2003 (Dixit, , p. 1296 . In each period, both buyers are randomly matched with sellers, where m bs denotes the probability that buyer b is matched with seller s. The matches are assumed to have the following properties:
MI1. Independence: In each period, matches of buyer 1 and 2 are independent of each other. Further, the actual match in period 1 does not affect the probabilities of matches in period 2-an assumption to make the analysis more tractable. In reality, buyers and sellers may build reputation and preserve matches that have had good outcomes. But as long as there is some exogenous probability of separation due to death or retirement of trading partners, qualitative results will be unaffected by this assumption (see also Dixit, 2003) .
MI2. Matching technology: In each period, each buyer b meets exactly one seller s. Hence ∑ s m bs = 1, b ∈ (1, 2). However, a seller can meet one, two or no buyer, i.e. ∑ b m bs ≤ 1 ∀ s. The latter assumption implies that trading involves search costs for sellers, which can differ among sellers.
MI3. Spread of information: If a buyer in a match cheats the seller, the seller can inform other sellers. We denote the probability that information sent by seller s is received by seller s by i ss . Information transmission is symmetric: i ss = i s s . Obviously i ss = 1.
Player types, information, strategies, and payoffs
Following Dixit (2003) there are two behavioral types of buyers: normal buyers (N-type) and Machiavellian buyers (M-type). The M-type buyers should be thought of as especially skillful cheaters. In period 1 types are unknown, where nature independently draws the type of each buyer, with ε being the probability that a buyer is of type M. The probability ε is assumed to be very small. In each period, four different matching scenarios are possible for each seller. We denote these by g = 0, 1, 2, 3: no match (g = 0), meeting buyer 1 (g = 1), meeting buyer 2 (g = 2), or meeting both buyers (g = 3). With given matching probabilities, it is straightforward to calculate the probability that a specific matching scenario occurs for each seller. We denote these probabilities by W sg .
If a seller is matched with a buyer he may know the buyer's history of cheating, if any, given the information mechanism described under MI3. For each matching scenario g, the stage game of matched sellers and buyers is as follows:
G1. Matched players simultaneously choose whether to play or not. The payoff of the outside opportunity for each player is normalized to zero.
G2. If a seller and a buyer choose to play, they play the following one-sided prisoner's dilemma game (OSPD g ).
Seller s formulates an exchange proposal (t bs , v bs ), 0 ≤ t bs ≤t b and v bs ∈ (v c , v). Buyer b can agree with this proposal, or reject. If b rejects, the game is over and both players receive their outside payoff of zero. If b agrees, then seller s delivers t bs units of commodity A to the buyer. After receiving t bs , the buyer can choose to be honest, i.e. return v · t bs units of commodity B to the seller, or the buyer can cheat and only return v c · t bs units, with 0 < v c < v. Hence, we assume that trading does not occur in a completely lawless environment, i.e. there is a limit to cheating, with a minimum degree of contract fulfillment being guaranteed by the state legal system at least for N-type buyers.
If b is honest, he receives payoff Π b (t bs , v bs ) which is always lower than, or equal to, his payoff from cheating Π b (t bs , v c ). Seller s's payoff depends on the matching scenario g. If a seller meets only one buyer, his payoff is Π s (t bs , v bs ) if the buyer is honest and Π s (t bs , v c ) if the buyer cheats. However, if seller s meets both buyers his possible payoffs from the game played with buyer b are conditional on his trade proposal made to the other buyer t −bs , i.e. ∑ b t bs v bs − C(t bs + t −bs ) if b is honest and t bs v c + t −bs v −bs − C(t bs + t −bs ) if b cheats, respectively. Thus, under scenario g = 3, a seller simultaneously plays two OSPD games, one with each of the two buyers. To formulate some further restrictions regarding the payoff functions of players, we define t o s = argmax Π s (t, v) and t c s = argmax Π s (t, v c ) < t o s as seller s's maximum trading volumes given prices v and v c , respectively.
If a buyer meets an M-type player, the latter always cheats. In particular, we assume that even if a seller proposes the state guaranteed exchange rate v c , M-type buyers still have sufficient cheating skills to reduce this price, while N-types pay v c . We thus assume that seller s will always make a loss, L > 0, when playing against an M-type buyer. Therefore, knowing that b is an M-type buyer implies that s will choose not to play. If s proposes the higher exchange rate v, cheating of any buyer will always imply the price v c , independently of the buyer's type.
We make two further assumptions: P1. It holds for any seller that (1 − ε)Π s (t c s , v c ) − εL > 0, which implies that every seller prefers to play when matched with a random buyer, where in period 2 sellers will always propose the minimal trading contract (t c s , v c ) to any unknown buyer they meet under matching scenarios 1 and 2, while they will propose (0.5t c s , v c ) to each single buyer under matching scenario 3.
P2. It holds for any buyer that
b ∀s, where, as defined below, c hs b is the expected payoff of an N-type player in period 2 who played honestly with seller s in period 1. P2 says that in a world where cheating is detected with certainty, no N-type buyer will choose to cheat. Thus, N-type buyers will only be tempted to cheat if there is a positive probability that cheating in period 1 will not be detected by future trading partners.
Equilibrium
Instead of a full derivation of equilibrium strategies, we focus on characterizing the equilibrium behavior of sellers and buyers, where a formal proof is available from the authors. The general solution concept is an imperfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium. By assumption, M-type players always choose to play, and if they play, they always cheat. Thus, the relevant strategies to be characterized are those of the sellers and N-type buyers.
The crucial point is that in equilibrium, N-type buyers will only play honestly in period 1 if their total expected payoff from playing honestly is higher than the payoff received from cheating. Given a trading proposal (t bs , v), cheating results in a profit gain of t bs (v − v c ) in period 1, while the cost of cheating results from the fact that in period 2 future trading partners might be informed about a buyer's cheating and refuse to play. Let given this equilibrium strategy of N-type buyers, a seller s's Bayesian updating on the information that a currently matched buyer cheated in period 1 results in the belief that this buyer is an M-type player. Therefore, choosing not to play with this buyer in period 2 is optimal. Overall, in equilibrium, each seller has a trading strategy in period 1, t * sg = (t * bsg ), v * sg = (v * bsg ), for each matching scenario g = 0, 1, 2, 3 which maximizes his expected profit. Assuming Q bs is sufficiently large so that sellers always cooperate in the first period 1 , equilibrium strategy can be characterized as follows:
Transaction costs and networks
Obviously, as long as ∑ b t * bsg < t o s , trading will be restricted from the view point of a seller, where trade restrictions are caused by a commitment problem of matched buyers to play honestly (t bs < t o s ), or due to search costs. In our simple trading game, commitment power of a buyer b vis-à-vis a seller s is exactly captured by the term Q bs , while search costs result from the fact that a seller is not matched with a buyer, or is matched with a buyer who has limited trading capacities (t b < t o s ).
In reality, firms often have to make production decisions before actually knowing which trading deals they can make. In this case, sellers have to make their production decision under uncertainty, i.e. they do not know which trading scenario g = 0, 1, 2, 3 will be realized. Assuming that non-sold quantities of commodity A have value v 0 s to the seller, his expected profit maximization with ex ante uncertainty of trading scenarios can be stated as follows:
where t * s denotes seller s's optimal production decision,t sg = ∑ b t * bsg are the equilibrium trading volumes resulting from our simple trading game, and I t>t sg is an indicator function that is one if t >t sg and zero otherwise. Obviously, TC s (t) can be interpreted as seller s's transaction costs of using the trading regime (MI1-MI3) reflecting inherent commitment and search problems. Further, TC s (t) is increasing stepwise in t, where the discontinuous jumps of the transaction costs occur at the equilibrium trade volumes of each trading scenario g (t =t sg ). Accordingly, the concrete specification of seller s's transaction cost function depends on the matching and information mechanism MI1-MI3.
How can we relate transaction costs of relation-based trading regimes with actual network structures of underlying interactions? In more specific terms, how can we relate a firm's personal, so-called ego-centric, network structures to its individual transaction costs, which result from commitment problems of trading partners?
To understand this relation intuitively, please note that both the matching and the information mechanisms are defined by a network of dyadic trading and information exchange relations among the set of traders. Accordingly, an ego-centric or personal business network of an individual trader i is defined as the subset of all dyadic relations among traders in the neighborhood of i, where the latter is defined as the subset of all traders which have a direct trading or information exchange relation with trader i.
Assume business occurs in separated small local trading worlds. In this case, it follows that small and dense ego-centric business networks increase commitment power of firms and hence reduce c.p. their transaction costs. To see this, consider a small local trading world comprising only one buyer and three sellers, where a seller s has a strong and direct information link to the two other sellers, i.e. i ss is close to 1, while all sellers have a strong trading link with the buyer b, say m s b = 0.33 for all s . Hence, the ego-centric business network of s is small with a size of 3 and dense, with a density of 2/3 = 0.67. Moreover, it follows that Q bs almost equals c hs b , that is cheating is detected with almost certainty and thus seller s has almost full commitment power vis-à-vis buyer b.
In a large global trading world, however, a seller meets many different buyers with a low matching frequency for a specific buyer. Hence, in a large trading world, a seller would need to form a large number of information ties to be able to commit all matched buyers. But, network ties are costly and hence the number of ties per firm is restricted. Accordingly, in a global trading world, a seller can only reach a large set of other trading partners via indirect information ties. It is well known in quantitative network theory (Rapoport, 1953) that the probability that information spreads from any node i to any other node j in a large network is determined by global network structures, i.e. the global network density and the global clustering of the network. Analogously, at the micro level, an actor's ego-centric network structures determine the probability that information sent by EGO will reach an average node in the network (see for example Henning and Saggau, 2010) , where the probability increases with size and decreases with density of the EGO's network.
Thus, in a global trading world, large and sparse (not dense) ego-centric business networks imply higher values of Q bs , which increase the commitment power of firms and lower their transaction costs. Compared to small local trading worlds, transaction costs are ceteris paribus higher, as information transmission is less efficient in large, as opposed to small networks. Moreover, please note that as long as business occurs in separated small trading worlds, large and sparse networks, including traders of different local trading worlds, are quite inefficient at committing to a specific local trader.
Empirical Framework
Overall, our theory implies that relation-based self-governance of trading involves commitment problems, which implies individual non-linear transaction costs of firms. Moreover, the density and size of a firm's ego-centric business network should have a significant impact on the firm's absolute and marginal transaction costs.
To test our theory empirically, we undertake an econometric estimation of the impact of social networks on transaction costs in commodity markets. Our starting point is the following Lagrangian for maximizing a farm's risk-adjusted profit including transaction cost:
where y y y = (y 1 , . . . , y N ) is a vector of N output quantities, x x x = (x 1 , . . . , x K ) is a vector of K input quantities, p i is the price of the ith output, w k is the price of the kth input, T y i are transaction costs for selling the ith output, T x k are transaction costs for purchasing the kth input, R y i is a risk premium due to price volatility of the ith output, λ is a Lagrangian multiplier, and F(y y y, x x x) denotes the transformation function with F(y y y, x x x) = 0 if the output quantities y y y can be produced from the input quantities x x x. The first-order conditions are 
Given a specified farm technology, F(y y y, x x x), the transaction costs function can be estimated econometrically based on firms' observed inputs and outputs, observed farm-specific input and output prices, as well as further farm characteristics.
Econometric models
In the first step we estimate F(y y y, x x x) as a flexible translog multiple-output stochastic Ray production frontier, as suggested by Löthgren (2000) . The key idea of this approach is to represent the vector of output quantities y y y by a distance component l(y y y) = y y y (its Euclidean norm) and a direction measure m m m(θ θ θ (y y y)), i.e. the polar coordinates (angles related to the ratio of one output to the others) with m m m(θ θ θ (y y y)) = 1.
In the second step, we estimate transaction cost parameters based on eq. (4). Taking the logarithm and replacing the logarithmic terms on the right-hand side by first-order Taylor series approximations yields after re-arrangements :
Given our theoretical results, we assume that the transaction costs T y i and T x k can be approximated by the quadratic functions
where
and β x k are unknown parameters. To estimate the influence of network parameters on transaction costs, we further parameterize the parameters of the transaction cost functions by 
p 1 w k ∀ k, and ε y i ∀ i ≥ 2 as well as ε x k ∀ k are stochastic error terms.
Data and estimation
For the econometric estimation of the above structural equations, we use accountancy data and data of ego-centric networks of Polish farms collected in an farm-household survey in 2007, conducted by the authors . We have a sample of 315 observations entering the first step of the estimation. However, at the second step, we had to disregard between 215 and 232 observations due to missing price data (see table 2). We distinguish two outputs, crop products and livestock products, as well as six inputs, labor, land, capital, intermediate inputs for crop production, intermediate inputs for livestock production, and general intermediate inputs. Furthermore, we include four variables in the model as explanatory variables for the inefficiency term, education (1 = low to 4 = high), experience (measured in years worked in agriculture), a dummy variable for mixed (non-specialized) farms, and the farmers' attitude to risk (1 = risk neutral to 4 = strong risk aversion). The multi-output stochastic ray production frontier model was estimated enforcing monotonicity in inputs applying a three-step estimation procedure proposed by Henningsen and Henning (2009) using the R package frontier (Coelli and Henningsen, 2010) . Estimated parameters of the unrestricted and restricted model are provided in .
Using the parameters of the adjusted restricted model, we compute the dependent variables for the second step of our estimation procedure, i.e. equations (10) and (11). In this step, we consider transaction costs on five markets, crop products, animal products, intermediate inputs for crop production, intermediate inputs for animal production, and general intermediate inputs, while we consider labor, land, and capital as quasi-fixed production factors. Following our theoretical hypothesis, we use two network parameters, density (z 1 ) and size (number of business contacts, z 2 ), calculated from farmers' ego-centric business networks. Following the state-of-the-art approach in quantitative network theory, we use three name generators to collect ego-centric business network data, i.e. we asked farm managers to name up to five most important suppliers of inputs and demanders of their outputs, as well as to name up to five most important other firms with whom they exchange valuable business information . Following the approach of Krackhardt (Wasserman and Faust, 1994) , we further ask farm managers to describe the relations between named business partners ranging from 0 = no relation to 3 = very close relation.
We denote crop products as first output (i = 1) so that the corresponding variables are used for the normalization in equations (10) and (11). Hence, we estimate a system of four equationsone equation (10) (with i = 2 for livestock products) and three equations (11) (with k = 1 for intermediate inputs for crop production, k = 2 for intermediate inputs for livestock production, and k = 3 for general intermediate inputs)-by seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) using the R package systemfit (Henningsen and Hamann, 2007) .
Given the parameter estimates of the second stage, we can calculate the estimated normalized marginal transaction costs by
To analyze estimated network effects on normalized marginal transaction costs, we take the partial derivatives of eqs. (12) and (13) with respect to density (z 1 ) and size (z 2 ).
Results
Summary statistics and estimated transaction cost parameters are presented in tables 1 and 2. Overall, estimation results can be summarized in the following points. First, as can be seen from table 3, we find considerable marginal transaction costs ranging from 32 % to 59 % of the corresponding input and output prices. Second, a significant influence of network parameters on both marginal proportional (ζ -parameters) and non-proportional (η-parameters) transaction costs results. However, single parameters are only significant at the 5%-level for network size (z 2 , see t-values for parameters ζ y i2 , ζ x k2 , η y i2 , η x k2 ), but not for network density (z 1 , see t-values for parameters ζ
, η x k1 in table 1). Third, on average, the following pattern of the impact of network parameters on transaction costs can be observed from table 3. While density lowers transaction costs on input markets and raises transaction costs on output markets, the opposite effect can be observed for network size.
How can these patterns be explained? Based on our above theoretical analysis, it follows that for globally traded goods, transaction costs are lower the larger and less clustered the business network of a firm.
By contrast, for locally traded goods, firms with dense and locally clustered business networks face comparatively low transaction costs, since they can better constrain their local business partners via direct contacts to their local clients. Clearly, locally clustered networks are less effective at constraining the opportunistic behavior of global firms.
Assuming inputs are locally traded and outputs are globally traded, the estimated patterns of network effects tend to support our theory. 
Conclusion
We see two contributions of this article to the emerging field of networks and economics. First, the article extends the theory by introducing transaction costs into existing network models of multilateral exchange. Second, we submit our extended theory to a comprehensive econometric empirical estimation of farms' marginal transaction costs. We find a significant quantitative impact of ego-centric network structures on these costs. This not only adds to the established theory of farm behavior and transaction costs, but also suggests future research on how policy intervention can be designed to change a farm's business networks to lower transaction costs.
